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A jubilant Lt. Robert G oodm an in Syria, with Jesse Jackson and U.S. Am bassador Robert Paganelli.

The Challenge of A Black
Presidential Candidacy
The fundam ental
relationship between B lacks
and the Democratic Party
m ust be renegotiated. N o
longer can B lacks allow
Democrats to take them and
their votes fo r granted.
Jesse L. Jackson,
The Washington Post,
April 10, 1983.
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direct role in shaping the national gov
ernment’s approach to dealing with im
portant domestic and foreign policy is
ive days after Christmas, the sues.
The significance, then, of Jackson’s Sy
Rev. Jesse Jackson was pictured
rian
mission is that he has achieved for
on the front page of The Wash
himself
a national pulpit rarely enjoyed by
ington Post with Syrian Ambas
Blacks in American politics. The question
sador to the United States, Rafic Jouejati.
The occasion was Jackson’s departure for is: What is the message he intends to de
Syria to seek the release of Navy Lt. liver to his new congregation, the Ameri
Robert 0. Goodman, who was captured can electorate?
after his fighter plane was shot down on The Strategic Debate Over
December 4, 1983.
A Black Presidential Candidacy
By Robert C. Smith
and Joseph P. McCormick, II

F

Amid reports from Syrian officials that
Donald Rumsfeld, President Reagan’s
special Middle East envoy, had not dis
cussed Goodman’s fate during high-level
talks in Syria, Jackson approached the Sy
rian government with a request to visit
Damascus and discuss Goodman’s physi
cal condition and possible release.1
The following week, the government
of Syria released Lt. Goodman. Jesse
Jackson, a private citizen, albeit a candi
date for the presidency, had succeeded in
pulling off the biggest foreign policy coup
by any non-incumbent in recent campaign
history.
This event did a number of things.
First, and perhaps foremost, it gave Jackson a great deal of sustained (free) media
exposure. Given his comparatively late
start in the race for the nomination, and
the considerable financial distance be
tween him and the Democratic front
runners, this was no small feat.
Second, it provided Jackson with the
opportunity to lay claim that he is an ef
fective leader, thereby reinforcing his
criticism of the political leadership of both
the Democratic and Republican Parties.
Finally, the Syria-Goodman episode
has placed Jackson in a very strong posi
tion to mold public opinion on the issues
and to challenge the American party sys
tem in order that Blacks may have a more
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol11/iss3/6

The strategic implications of a Black pres
idential candidacy in 1984 have been
analyzed in scores of newspaper articles
and columns, and in a series of papers by
academicians and professional campaign
strategists. Analysts have given consid
eration to the number of delegates a
Black candidate is likely to win; to ques
tions of campaign organization and financ
ing; to the question of which Democratic
candidate is likely to be helped or hurt by
the insurgency, and to whether Ronald
Reagan’s re-election prospects are en
hanced.
Attention has also been given to the
impact of the candidacy on the Black lead
ership group’s cohesiveness and efficacy;
to the impact of the candidacy on Black
voter turn-out and the election of Blacks
to other offices; to the question of
whether the candidacy will intensify racial
polarization in the electorate; to the ques
tion of whether the candidacy will con
tribute to the Democratic Party’s sup
posed image as a captive of “special inter
e s ts ,” and to questions of Jackson’s
character and competency.2
These analyses, while useful, are in
herently problematic, given the dynamics
of the politics of presidential choice in the
United States. The art of political fore
casting by journalists and academics is
simply too crude to provide anything

other than speculative answers to most of
the questions posed.
Ample evidence of the problematic
character of such pre-election analyses is
available to anyone who wishes to exam
ine the writing of journalistic and
academic pundits a year prior to the elec
tions of 1968,1972,1976, and 1980.3 Such
analyses are useful for purposes of dis
cussion and debate but should not be
taken as either a diagnosis of the situation
or as a guide to action because, given the
volatility of recent presidential elections,
one simply cannot predict the impact of
the Jackson candidacy on the outcome of
the 1984 election. This is especially the
case given the insurgency or “movement”
character of the Jackson campaign.
In addition, such analyses typically
overlook a fundamental purpose of a pres
idential campaign. In his elegant treatise,
The American Presidency (1976), Grant
McConnell writes:
The President performs one of his most im
portant services before he ever reaches
office. This service consists very simply of
campaigning. He shares this service with
his opponent and, indeed, with all wouldbe candidates who have been eliminated in
the long tortuous process of national
choice, for the process of selecting a presi
dent is sometimes as important a feature of
the office as the emergence of a particular
individual as president. The contest-and
all the conferring, caucusing, bargaining,
and scheming-is the indispensable means
by which each four years the record of the
past is reviewed and a new assessment of
the state of the nation is made by the people.
Here is the way in which old compromises
are examined, and perhaps revised, and
new ones made among the many elements
of the population. It is the occasion upon
which every citizen is called on to think of
him or herself as an American.
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If one accepts McConnell’s proposition
that the “process of electing a president is
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sometimes as important a feature of the
Principal proponents of this strategy of
office as the emergence of a particular in abandoning the liberal agenda are Hamil
dividual as president, ” then it seems ap ton Jordan and Bert Lance, erstwhile pro
propriate to analyze the Jackson in teges of President Jimmy Carter. In a
surgency not in terms of “strategy” and series of speeches and conferences
“tactics” as these are conventionally un across the South, Lance and Jordan have
derstood, but rather one should examine argued that if the Democratic Party
it systemically, i. e ., in terms of its impact wishes to carry the South (by which they
on the American party system and the mean the white South), it has to move
future direction of public policy.
away from the traditional liberalism of the
This is the purpose of this analysis. New Deal-Great Society eras toward a
Specifically, we examine Jackson’s candi more conservative stance.
dacy in terms of its potential to (1) con
tribute to the development of an authentic
liberal-progressive agenda and consti We may be faced in
tuency and (2) its potential to contribute
to Black political empowerment, inde November, 1984, with a
pendence, and leverage in American elec choice not unlike that
toral politics.
Our assessment of the success of his seen in 1980.
campaign is based not on the number of
delegates obtained, nor on whether
In a recent issue of the New Republic,
the Democratic front-runners or Reagan
Jordan
raised the “special in te rest”
are helped or hurt, but instead on the na
canard
by
arguing that the Democratic
ture of Jackson’s definition of the Black
predicament and the consequent ideology Party is too liberal in part because it is the
and policies he argues are necessary to captive of “special interests” (Blacks,
feminists, educators and labor) and that
address that predicament.
Also, this assessment is based on the the Democratic nominee and platform
extent to which Jackson is willing to chal should take a public stand in opposition to
lenge the Democratic Party in order to one or more of these groups.4 This
build an independent base of Black power “southern strategy” may appeal to the in
in the party system. In our view, these terests and prejudices of southern whites
are the fundamental challenges of and to but, for Blacks, it is a prescription for the
Jackson. The success or failure of his “benign neglect” of the deepening crisis
campaign, in the final analysis will be de of the underclass.
Clearly, the foremost challenge of the
termined on the basis of how he and the
Jackson
candidacy is to articulate a
party system meet these challenges.
“Black” strategy to counteract the emerg
The Challenge of Ideology
ing southern strategy of right wing white
The Democratic Party is under pressure southern Democrats. Such a strategy is
to abandon its progressive heritage and seen as imperative for several reasons.
the unfinished liberal agenda in order to
First, the fundamental economic and
realign itself with the alleged conserva social problems confronting Blacks re
tive mood of the electorate. The first chal quire at a minimum the enactment of the
lenge of the Jackson campaign, therefore,
unfinished liberal agenda and may, in fact,
is to maintain the liberal hour in a time of require the development of an explicit so
cial democratic agenda along the lines of
conservative reaction.
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the advanced democracies of Western
Europe.
Second, the probability of Blacks sup
porting a liberal-leftward strategy is
rather high. For example, recent data in
dicate 85% of Black Americans respond
to domestic and foreign issues in a
liberal-leftward way (see Norman Nie, S.
Verba and J. Petrocik, The Changing
American Voter, Cambridge, 1976, pp.
253-55).
Finally, this strategy is imperative be
cause Blacks are as important a part of
the Democratic Party coalition as white
southerners, contributing approximately
20% of the party’s vote in recent national
elections.5
These imperatives dictate a liberalprogressive agenda for any candidate who
would seek to represent the Black com
munity in presidential politics.
This paper is not intended to develop in
detail the unfinished agenda of American
liberalism but, at a minimum, such an
agenda should include the following:
■ A reconstruction of the economic sys
tem so that it provides maximum feasible
employment for all citizens willing and
able to work, at wages adequate to sus
tain self and family.
■ Reform of the welfare system so that
it is genuinely work-related, i.e., it oper
ates to provide adequate income to those
who cannot find work, to supplement the
income of those who work but at inade
quate wages (the working poor) and to
provide decent support for those who for
reasons of age or physical or mental hand
icap cannot work.
■ A comprehensive national health in
surance system with rigorous cost incen
tives and controls on the health service
industry.
■ Reform of the educational system to
assure the widest availability of child-care
3
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and higher educational opportunities to all
citizens.
■ Reform of the military budget to limit
expenditures to strictly defined purposes
of defense rather than war.
■ A comprehensive, federally-directed
program to begin the re-industrialization
of the nation and the rebuilding of its in
frastructure with maximum feasible par
ticipation of local citizens in planning and
implementation.
■ A renewed commitment to the princi
ple of affirmative action as requisite to
social justice and equity.6
The Imperative of Full Employment
The central item on this agenda is the
development of a comprehensive set of
policies designed to achieve full employ
ment in a relatively short period of time.
Unemployment has been a longstanding
problem in the Black community. Only
three times between 1949 and 1974 did
the official Black unemployment fall
below 6% while for whites during the
same period only twice did it rise above
6%. This long term and persistent high
unemployment is the major causal factor
in the development of the Black under
class and the “tangle of pathologies’'
(female-headed households, crime, drug
addiction, welfare dependency, al
coholism, etc.) that characterize this part
of the Black community.7
The national Black leadership has long
recognized the centrality of unemploy
ment in the Black predicament in the
United States. It is sometimes over
looked that the 1963 March on Washing
ton was a march for “Jobs and Freedom. ”
It is also often forgotten that when Martin
Luther King was murdered he was pre
paring to lead a Poor Peoples’ march in
Washington whose central demand was
full employment.
Also, at a 1973 conference of scholars
called by the National Urban League to
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol11/iss3/6

consider post-civil rights issues, Profes
sor Charles Hamilton presented a paper
arguing that there should be a combined
effort by civil rights and labor groups to
initiate the vigorous push for a full em
ployment bill. Finally, the centerpiece of
the Congressional Black Caucus’ first
Legislative Agenda was “The Equal Op
portunity and Full Employment” bill.

Jesse Jackson’s candidacy
is of great symbolic sig
nificance. It represents
another step in the his
toric struggle by Blacks
for equality of access and
opportunity in the political
process.
This bill, as originally introduced by the
late Senator H ubert Humphrey and
caucus member Augustus Hawkins, pro
posed that the United States establish for
each of its citizens a legal entitlement to a
job enforceable through the courts; re
quire the federal government to serve as
employer of last resort and reduce unem
ployment to three percent within 18
months after passage. A revised version
signed by President Carter deleted all of
these provisions and substituted a vague
promise to reduce unemployment to four
percent within five years of enactment.
These radical revisions of the bill were in
part extracted by Carter in negotiations
with the Congressional Black Caucus in
exchange for his support.
Inadequate though the final act is, it
does, as Congressman John Conyers {In
These Times, November, 1978, p. 16) ar
gues, provide “a framework for full em
ployment planning. ” Among the elements

of a program that could be implemented
under the act Congressman Conyers pro
poses are: a massive targeted job training
and employment program focusing on the
revitalization of cities; a communityworker ownership program for aban
doned industries; work sharing; and an
anti-inflation program that deals with ad
ministered pricing, excessive military
spending, and some form of wage and
price controls.8
A serious and potentially effective na
tional full employment policy would entail
integrating Conyer’s proposals into a
comprehensive program to achieve price
stabilization and economic revitalization.
This progressive program requires a
party and candidates willing to commit
themselves to a long term effort to rein
vigorate the liberal agenda through wellreasoned and symbolically attractive
political campaigns capable of unifying the
nation’s disparate constituencies.

41

The first challenge of the Jackson cam
paign, then, is to contribute to the devel
opment of this as the new path for the
Democratic Party in the last quarter of
the 20th century.9
The Challenge of Political
Independence
The second challenge to Jesse Jackson
and the Democratic Party is in many ways
more difficult than the first. This chal
lenge requires that Jackson be willing and
able to carry his insurgency into the gen
eral election as an independent candidate
if the Democratic Party yields to the
pressures of its right wing and repudiates
its progressive heritage and the liberal
agenda.
The latter challenge is more difficult
than the former because it would almost
certainly lead to the re-election of Ronald
Reagan, which would be contrary to the
main 1984 objectives of many Black
leaders.
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1984
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Yet even if Reagan were re-elected, it
is conceivable Congress would at a mini
mum reject further tax cuts, reductions in
social expenditures or further increases
in military outlays. Thus, assuming war is
avoided, the worst of the “Reagan Revo
lution” — from a Black standpoint —
would be over in 1985, except for his con
tinued attacks on the symbolic structure
of Black rights and affirmative action.10
It should be emphasized, however, that
an independent challenge by Jackson
should be undertaken only if the Demo
cratic nominee and the party’s platform
reject a liberal and progressive agenda. In
this eventuality, a democratic president
— if elected in 1984 — is not likely to
propose policies that fundamentally and
specifically address Black needs and con
cerns; rather he is more likely to be a
Carter “clone” of Reagan, to use Senator
Edward Kennedy’s phrase. As Con
gressman John Conyers has written (The
Progressive, November, 1983, p. 11):
Cutbacks in the Government’s redistribu
tional programs and the military buildup
did not begin with the Reagan Administra
tion. The retreat from full employment as
the guiding principle of economic policy
took place under Jimmy Carter. And de
spite their Congressional victories in No
vember 1982, Democrats failed to seize the
initiative and reverse the course of Rea
ganomics. Instead, Democratic Congres
sional leaders collaborated in a muddle of
bipartisanship that only reinforced conser
vative demands.
The collapse of liberal Democratic poli
tics has left a gaping hole in both leadership
and policy. After years of turning away
from a commitment to equity, evading con
troversial stands on urgent issues, and
failing to advance farsighted programs,
Democrats have become remote from the
discontents as well as the dreams of ordi
nary citizens. 11
Thus we may be faced in November,
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1984, with a choice not unlike that seen in
1980. In that event, many Blacks and pro
gressives probably would stay at home or
vote for John Anderson [based on the as
sumption that he may run again] thereby
re-electing Ronald Reagan anyway.12
If one believes there are other objec
tives in the politics of presidential choice
this year, then a case can be made for the
feasibility of Jesse Jackson running as an
independent.
The Jackson insurgency should have an
importance that transcends the election
of 1984. It can and should be used as part
of a movement to establish an independ
ent base of Black political power in the
electoral process.13 While there are risks
in this approach, we believe the potential
long-term gains outweigh the potential
short-term losses.
In addition to offering an alternative to
the conservatism of the two-party sys
tem, an independent candidacy would
make unmistakably clear to the powersthat-be in the Democratic Party that the
Black vote can no longer be taken for
granted. A constant refrain of Democratic
Party strategists (especially in private
discussions) is that Black issues tend to
be expensive and divisive and, therefore,
should be ignored because in the general
election the Black vote has no place to go
but Democratic.
These strategists assume that the
Black vote is safe, therefore, the party
should adopt candidates and a platform
designed to appeal to more problematic
constituency groups, i.e., urban ethnics
or white southerners. A Jackson chal
lenge in the 1984 general election would
fundamentally alter this strategic calcula
tion.
Finally, assuming that Jackson wins at
least five percent of the national vote and
at least one-third of the Black vote, his
candidacy would lay the organizational
and financial base for the future construc

tion of an on-going independent Black
political base in national politics, and con
tribute an important element to the build
ing of an alternative progressive coalition
within or outside the two-party system.
Conclusion
Choosing the president is arguably the
most important act of American citizen
ship. Jesse Jackson’s candidacy is thus of
great symbolic significance, representing
yet another step in the historic struggle
by Blacks for equality of access and op
portunity in the political process. Sym
bolism is not unimportant in politics.
However, we believe if this candidacy is
to represent more than a symbolic act,
Jackson and the Democratic Party must
forthrightly address the challenges posed
by the Black predicament.15
It is not possible to predict at the outset
of the campaign what its outcome will be.
Nor, however, was it possible at the out
set to predict the outcome of the great
civil rights campaigns at Birmingham and
Selma. What is possible to predict is that
if Jesse Jackson ignores the challenges
posed herein, his campaign will not, as
Professor Mack Jones of Atlanta Univer
sity puts it, “represent a qualitative
change in the nature of Black political par
ticipation but rather more of the same.”16
And more of the same represents a be
trayal of the legitimate interests and aspi
rations of Black people in the United
States.
□

The au th ors are m em bers o f the p o litica l science f a c 
ulty a t H o w a rd U niversity. T h is article is a revised
version o f a p a p e r prep a red f o r a fo ru m on B la c k s a n d
P re sid e n tia l P olitics, spon sored by the B la c k P olitics
F ie ld C o m m ittee o f the D e p a rtm e n t o f P o litic a l S c i
ence, a n d the N a tio n a l C onference o f B la c k P o litica l
Scien tists. T he fo ru m w as h eld a t H o w a r d la st N o 
vem ber 17.
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